ABSTRACT: During the past few decades, the work done by W.H. Zurek and others has finally clarified the interpretation of quantum mechanical 'measurement'. This work has unified the domains of quantum physics, thermodynamics, and information theory. The cumulative meaning and significance of this work has yet to be acknowledged or assimilated. In particular, answers to fundamental ontological questions such as 'of what is the universe made?' and 'how do we obtain our knowledge of it?' can now be given much more complete and consistent answers within the paradigm of science-based rationalism. Furthermore, Zurek's work is consistent with the proposition that analytically independent hierarchical layers of organization (interactions in particle physics, the emergent classical world, the time-binding information structures of biological life) can be modelled using a consistent set of tools and techniques. The traditional, pre-modern view of the universe as organized in a self-similar way by principles of 'divine harmony' can now be transformed into a scientifically supportable statement that the universe is a hierarchically self-similarity mathematical structure created by recursive application of mechanisms of information transmission. The fundamental 'unit' of the 'universe that we experience' is an information transmission event, and 'we' as conscious beings are emergent structures of such events. I. The Playing Field Who are the players in the game of reality, and on what kind of field do they play? We will begin by stating the following preconditions, which we ask you to accept 'at least for the purposes of argument'. They are, in my opinion, uncontroversial to both experts and laypeople. Please note that these are expressions of existence and possibility - they are not at all intended to contradict or exclude other analytical systems and labellings. 1. There exists a universe. 2. Conscious observers exist embedded within (or communicating with) a shared subset of this universe. 3. It is possible to construct systematic mappings between the 'universe', the 'perceptual universe' of the observers, and systems of symbols such as language and mathematics. (Italics)The exact formulation of the above principles is not important(italics off). To express the above in a more casual fashion: "You and I are both living in the same universe, and we can talk to each other about it." Although philosophers are paid to pretend to doubt the truth of the above, their marriages would never survive unless they behaved as if they believed it. It is interesting and valuable to investigate the boundary conditions of ontology - to contemplate solipsism, infinitely powerful deceiving demons, or mystic theology of an unperceived and imperceivable universe to which language and thought cannot connect. However, this paper is situated within the rationalist tradition which asserts that statements about the universe and the minds of observers are meaningful, regardless of the precise analytical linguistic divisions between 'mind' and 'matter' and thought vs reality. As has been pointed out by numerous writers, and very cogently by Penrose [cite unreasonable effectiveness, road to reality] there is a fascinating circularity to the relationship of material universe, mental awareness, and formal symbol systems. This chicken vs. egg priority problem will not be our focus or concern. In short, we are situating our discourse within the universe 'that any five year old can understand.' II. Why should I believe in physics, anyway? An excellent question! We will leave aside the question of religion and miracles on Laplacian grounds for the moment. It boils down to this: can you unscramble an egg? Do you believe the rotation of the planet will bring the Sun into view in the morning? The reason to 'believe in science' to use a horribly imprecise and unscientific formulation) is its incredible success in making rule-based predictions that can often be expressed as nearly absolute factual statements. I would like to avoid making what might be termed 'absolute categorical' statements that imply absolute certainty, 100% correspondence, logical infallibility, and the like. Working scientists have worked out a good vocabulary and paradigm of models, testable predictions, and a process based ideology. In the largest sense, 'believing in science' does not mean believe in any specific so-called fact or theory - it means believing in the validity of the scientific method of hypothesize, predict, test, and revise as a method for generating knowledge. That said, there are certain models and concepts that are so well established and universal that it makes sense to refer to them as 'factual'. The scientific explanation for the fact that the sun rises every morning is a very good example to study for a moment. (I apologize for belaboring simple, common sense examples, but their very simplicity and uncontroversial nature make them the correct choice for discussion of fundamentals.) We begin first with the principles of sensory evidence and induction. Even in the complete absence of any theory of astronomy the statement 'the sun rises every morning' and the testable prediction 'the sun will tomorrow morning' are good examples of science in action. As soon as the first human being learned to EXPECT that the sun would rise in the morning (in other words, to make a prediction), he had, in effect, become a scientist - he was generating knowledge and predictions as a consequence of rules generated by induction on a data set. This simple form of science - making generalizations from observations - should not be discounted. The assertion, based on repeated experiment, that "you cant unscramble an egg" is a perfectly good scientific theory, even in the absence of a mathematical formulation of Boltzmann's law or an ability to mathematically partition the state space of the egg. Furthermore - as soon as you accept the validity of generating prediction rules based on induction from repeated consistent observations - you 'believe in science'. In other words, simple common sense of the 'dont touch the stove or youll get burned' variety is an entirely sufficient condition for acceptance of the rationalist, science based world view. Needless to say, many (most? all?) humans are inconsistent in these regards in terms of their verbal statements and psychological attitudes. Convincing a skeptic that believing in a scientific idea that seems strange to them is actually a consequence of simple, commonsense logic connecting repeated observations to explanations is rarely successful on an emotional level. One of the reasons we are addressing matters that are regarded as 'accepted by default' for any working scientist is to try to bridge this gap. Our case is that once you are willing to agree with the statement 'you cant unscramble an egg' you have committed yourself to a chain of logic and evidence that supports ontological philosophical statments of immense depth and generality. There is now an unbroken chain of almost unchallengable evidence and deduction between the simple reality of a scrambled egg and the nature of the universe and our relation to it. (Yes, we are indeed part of the universe, and the traditionally dichotomous language between consciousness and physical reality causes some statements to seem misleading and paradoxical. I apologize for this, a certain amount of generosity in interpretation on the part of the reader when it comes to imprecise yet conventional language formulations will be appreciated.) II. Why should I believe in *our* physics? Many might grant the basic validity of the scientific method yet claim that our current models and mathematics are purely provisional, with no claim to finality or fundamentality. It is easy to point to concepts such as newtonian/euclidean absolute space and time (the foundation for kant's philosophy) and their subsequent loss of primary status to provide evidence for the proposition that the incomplete and inherently malleable state of our knowledge means that it is fundamentally impossible to move from the contingent nature of our theories to statements of a philosophical nature. Another objection would be simple skepticism over the accuracy of our current models. Even if you believe it is possible to determine ontological level truths from physics, you can assert that our current physics is simply factually wrong! Although these are fundamentally different challenges, I believe they can both be profitably addressed in the same way - to quote Joe Friday [cite dragnet] "Just the facts, maam." The best argument on behalf of accepting that much of modern physics can simply be regarded as 'true and factual, if the words true and factual can be applied to anything'. I must refer to our friend, the well-scrambled egg. The experimental evidence for our best theories is fully as convincing as the reality of scrambled eggs failing to unscramble themselves. We can make extremely accurate predictions about the behavior of systems on scales from the sub-microscopic to the cosmological using a consistent set of mathematical tools. The QED prediction for the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron, the numerous tests of special relativity in the large and basic quantum mechanics in the small, as well as the immense and overwhelming conformance of daily life to the classical principles of thermodynamics (our friend the egg) and 'newtonian' physics - I believe all of these things show very clearly that we should not anticipate any sudden immense upending of our understanding of the world. Even the revolutions of relativity and the quantum were 'progressive' revolutions and cannot be regarded as 'negations' of what came before. Einstein did not arrive and prove that objects fell up towards the sky rather than down towards the ground and that the orbits of the planets were square or that time ran backwards on mars. Narrative is dangerous. We like to speak of scientific revolutions, of 'competing' theories, of the 'battle' of ideas, and certainly human politics can make the forms and methods of science as a social discipline take this form. Also, just as the human eye is attracted to motion, the mind is attracted to contrast and differentiation. The fact that a new scientific theory is still constructed with standard mathematical tools and notation, still makes use of established numerical constants and vast numbers of existing results - none of that is news, it is assumed and taken for granted, but it still must be taken into account and acknowledged when reckoning the 'reliability' of scientific theories. The vast and unstated areas of consistency and overlap go mostly uncommented on.